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ABSTRACT 
 The effects of military expenditures on an economy are characterized by a lack of 
agreement amongst economists.  Classical economists, or free-market thinkers, contend that 
spending on defense diverts resources from more efficient purposes.  On the other hand, 
Keynesians or those of the Structurialist school, argue that defense spending can improve 
economic growth through the improvement and construction of important infrastructures. 
 Research prior to the 1990’s was identified through a non-econometric approach which 
we will denote as the First Generation.   Economists would analyze the issue from a theoretical 
standpoint.  This provided the foundation for research from the 1990’s onward, as econometric 
tools became more sophisticated.  In recent years, economists have been able to test the 
legitimacy of the theories put forth in the first generation. 
 Despite the use of various models, including least-squares regressions, endogenous 
growth, growth curves, economists still lack a general consensus.  Furthermore, many models 
suggest that there is no relationship between economic growth and military expenditures at all.  
This paper explores ideas from both a theoretical and econometric point of view, standpoints of 
which includes a positive, negative, or no relationship, between military expenditures and 
economic growth.   
 From our analysis, we argue that the best approach involves a country by country 
analysis as opposed to a generalized view.  Each country has its own characteristics that can 
influence the relationship between defense spending, or any other factors, and economic growth. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 In this report, we focus on the relationship between the defense burden and GDP growth. 
To identify this relationship, we have outlined the steps as follows.  We begin by dividing a 
literature review into two generations.  Second, we consider this relationship using a unique 
dataset for the former Soviet States in Eastern Europe.  While economic growth remains a 
popular research topic, the effects of military spending on growth has been largely ignored.   
 The primary concern when considering the relationship between the defense burden and 
growth is that the prior belief of this particular relationship is unclear.  There are two major 
schools of thought that we will discuss later in the paper, namely, the “Structuralist School”, led 
by Emile Benoit, and the “Free Market Thinkers”, led by Robert Barro.  The Structuralists 
contend that military expenditures may be beneficial to economic growth, particularly in terms of 
increased employment opportunities.  The Free Market Thinkers contend that the diversion of 
funds to military expansion would thereby reduce economic growth by preventing the funds 
from going to more productive uses.  Alas, some economists will claim that there is no 
significant relationship at all.   
 Other economists will argue that the relationship between military expenditures and 
growth depends on the level of economic development, and that some economies, perhaps 
developed economies like the United States, are more likely to realize positive benefits from 
higher military expenditures, due to research and development.  Some Structuralists, namely 
Emile Benoit, who we will discuss in detail later on, will assert that developing economies 
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benefit most from a high military presence due to their building of infrastructure.  These are all 
topics that will be discussed in later chapters. 
 For the empirical section of this report, we examine that case of the former Soviet 
republics in eastern Europe. We believe that this is an important example since these economies 
are recognized as transitional economies, that is, economies that are undergoing a change from a 
centrally planned economy to a market economy. 
 The implications of such a study are not just beneficial for the countries of interest.  As 
the U.S. enters another election year, the defense burden tends to remain a point of debate, as 
politicians on both sides of party lines encourage the increase or decrease of military spending.  
Military topics are also worth discussing as major figures such as Bill Gates are citing a serious 
imbalance of the source of NATO support, with the US being the main contributor1.   With no 
definitive answer as to what may happen as a result, it is important to continue studying the 
defense-growth relationship, particularly as the growing threat of terrorism rises.  
 The next section recognizes the first generation of research on the effects of military 
spending and economic growth. These papers are marked largely by a non-econometric 
approach. Starting with a brief overview of the literature prior to 1970, we will discuss three 
major contributors, namely: Emile Benoit, Daniel Landau, and Robert Barro.  The next chapter 
will emphasize newer approaches by Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Casey Borch and Michael Wallace, 
and Giorgio d’Agostino.  Our final focus will be based on exploring both groups of researchers 
which helps clarify our own empirical results. 
                                                          
1 This is especially important as US tanks are rolling into Germany (who could easily provide tanks and other 
armored vehicles and artillery) and other Eastern European countries as of June of 2015 in attempt to diffuse the 
Ukrainian Crimea Crisis.  This was reported from a June 2015 CNN article. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW: CHAPTER 2: THE FIRST GENERATION 
BEFORE 1970 
 Prior to the 1970’s, the main focus of macroeconomists was searching for the general 
answer on what spurs economic growth.   Robert Solow proposed his own growth model using 
neoclassical theory, from which Kuznets was influenced. However, defense or military spending 
was not a typical parameter in their models. In one of Kuznets’ most well-known works, Modern 
Economic Growth (1966), he proposes the following: “Political instability and 
nonrepresentativeness of the regimes, combined with an authoritarian structure dominated by 
personalist leaders and backed by familial and ethnic ties and the police, are hardly favorable 
conditions for economic growth… (Kuznets, pg 483).”  
Kuznets took a cautious approach to his interpretation of the relationship of the political 
economy by analyzing general correlations amongst GDP growth and various metrics for 
political freedom for various developing countries.  Kuznets’ remarks “the absence of a cogent 
and quantitatively testable theory of interrelations between political structure and modern 
economic growth is no ground for dismissing {sic} more obvious implications from the dataset 
(Kuznets, 452).”   Kuznets’s work in economic growth was considered a pinnacle work in its 
time, leading Kuznets to earn the Nobel Peace Prize in Economics for his work in economic 
growth.   
While defense spending and its effects were not widely researched at this time, Kuznets’ 
general comments on growth were widely popular during the 1950’s and 1960’s. 
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 THE FIRST GENERATION:1970s-CHAPTER 2-1 
As the Cold War and arms race between the United States and the Soviet Union waned 
on, defense spending and economic growth started to become a prominent research topic.   In 
1973, Emile Benoit published a pinnacle work in defense economics titled Defense and 
Economic Growth in Developing Countries”.  Benoit was amongst the first to specifically 
address defense spending in growth models. The premise of his work was based on “the relation 
between defense programs and the rate of economic growth between 1950 and 1965 in 44 
developing countries accounting in 1965 for around 80% of defense expenditure in the 
developing world, exclusive of mainland China (Benoit, pg 1).   The approach that Benoit took 
was similar to Kuznets in the sense that he observed trends amongst these countries without 
employing more sophisticated econometric tools. Through Benoit’s work, he observed that “the 
simple correlation between defense burdens and growth rates was strongly positive: countries 
with high growth rates tended to have high defense burdens, and vice versa (2, Benoit)”. 
However, Benoit’s analysis led his research to become criticized, later on.  In spite of this, his 
work was instrumental for identifying avenues of research for the newer generation.  
When discussing military expenditures and economic growth, the first argument that 
appears is what is described by Benoit as “Investment Effects” and then broken down further 
into “Productivity Effects” and “Income Shifts Effects”.  He formally defines Investment Effects 
as “the diversion into defense uses of resources that would otherwise have gone into investment 
(Benoit, 8).”  Investment Effects are commonplace in other facets of economics, whereas 
Productivity Effects and Income Shifts Effects are specifically outlined by Benoit.  “Productivity 
Effects are related to the general lack of measurable productivity growth in the government and 
5 
 
defense sector (Benoit, pg 11)”.  Furthermore, as resources are diverted to military or 
government purchases, they are not being used in a productive manner.  Income Effects are more 
specific and related directly to the “implied reduction in the size of the civilian product when a 
part of GDP is shifted or reallocated to the defense sector (Benoit, pg 14).”   Whether the latter 
two are actual GDP effects is up to interpretation by Benoit.  This can be dangerous in the sense 
that there is no true way to measure the Productivity and Income Shift Effects.  Because Benoit’s 
book focuses on developing countries, he makes no mention of possible externalities, such as 
research and development, as a result of increased military expenditure. 
Benoit’s data is pulled from two different time periods (1950-1965 and 1960-1965) 
which he calls the A series and C series respectively.  “The 44 countries were not scientifically 
selected, rather they were chosen on the basis of including as many countries as possible for 
which constant price estimates could be obtained both of national product and of defense 
expenditures” (Benoit, pg 37).  This process thereby excludes some countries that may be 
interesting from a research standpoint.  Some countries are of our particular interest, including 
the now defunct Yugoslavia.  Benoit was skeptical of taking data from his countries of interest, 
so he instead used the estimates from the UN, IMF, AID, and IBRD sources, with the exception 
of 12 countries, which will be discussed later.   
To conduct his analysis, Benoit used the following metrics: “growth rate of GDP  (called 
G), civilian GDP, found by subtracting defense expenditures from GDP (denoted by G’), the 
defense burden (B), which he defines as a ratio of defense expenditures to GDP both at current 
prices and local currency, investment (I), and external resources (R)2 (Benoit,  pg 69). Benoit 
                                                          
2 External Resources mainly encompasses bilateral aid. 
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used Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation to get a basic idea of the data.  It was in this 
investigation where Benoit noted positive correlations between the defense burden, B, and GDP 
growth, G.  Benoit “tested his results in three ways: First by excluding from the sample twelve 
countries for which the comparability of the data might be questioned (Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Ghana, Kenya, Jordan, Syria, Tanzania, Uganda, South Vietnam, and 
Zambia); second by examining the correlation for the years 1960-1965 alone, for which the data 
are undoubtedly more reliable and consistent; and third, by adding nine other countries (Algeria, 
Bolivia, Cambodia, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Jamaica, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and  Uruguay) to the 44 
country sample (Benoit, pg 70)”.   The removal of the 12 countries was due to the level of 
trustworthiness of the data, as Benoit was unable to get reliable estimates from a multilateral 
institution such as the IMF or World Bank.    For the first exercise, of the 32 countries Benoit’s 
“analysis showed a positive simple correlation between B and G of 0.51 with a t-value of 3.2 
(Benoit, 70).  The third exercise which included nine other countries had a correlation of 
determination, (which is used to determine the strength and direction of a relationship), r=0.31, 
and t-value of 2.4, which is significant at the 5% level, albeit significantly weaker than the 
comparable data set was used (Benoit, pg 71).   
 Benoit employs simple linear regression to continue his investigation between B and G 
and maintains that the two metrics are positively correlated. He conducts several hypothesis tests 
to detect spuriousness and significance of his coefficients3, all of which support his final 
conclusion in which high defense burdens are conducive to higher rates of economic growth.  
                                                          
3 As described in the previous page. 
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This is the extent of which Benoit used statistical procedures.  Furthermore, the vagueness and 
incomplete nature of his analysis led him to be susceptible to disapproval. 
Through Benoit’s study, defense burdens and GDP growth became a more compelling 
research topic.  Unfortunately for Benoit, many of his methods were criticized, beginning with 
the dataset.  Due to the potential unreliability of some of the countries’ data and general lack of 
fit with other observations, Benoit removed observations, for which he was severely disparaged.  
While sophisticated empirical studies were rarely done in the 1970s, the general nature of 
Benoit’s “econometric” study was marked as too simplistic.  A Spearman Correlation (mostly 
Pearson Correlations, now), are generally not accepted as a reason to make conclusions about 
correlations.   
The chief concern regarding Benoit’s work is his regression model.  While he claims to 
test the “spuriousness”, it is difficult to make suppositions of such a model due to the lack of 
parameters, particularly more control variables, in the model.  In fairness, this could be due to the 
lack of computing ability in the early 1970’s, however, the model should include more than the 
metrics listed in a previous section.  General consensus amongst economists supports that there 
are many influencing factors in GDP growth, including defense burdens, but also parameters like 
educational attainment and access to healthcare.  Economic growth tends to be a mystified 
research question and there are no accepted parameters that must be included.  Despite these 
shortcomings, Benoit is considered a paramount work in defense economics due to the shocking 
level of his findings.  Benoit’s conclusions are unique in the sense that very few economists have 
found such positive correlations.  At best, many economists find inconclusive results.  Alas, the 
irreproducibility of Benoit’s study has made it a compelling debate. 
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1980’s- CHAPTER 2-2 
The 1980’s ushered in further research on defense spending and economic growth, led 
primarily by Daniel Landau. At this time, many of Benoit’s practices in his 1973 work have 
already been deemed obsolete.  Landau’s 1983 paper, “Government Expenditures and Economic 
Growth: A Cross Sectional Study” was paradigm to Robert Barro’s future work, which we will 
discuss in a further section.  Landau’s initial paper was much more econometrically involved 
than Benoit’s.  Landau is able to utilize data from the World Bank involving 104 countries total 
“minus eight oil exporters or 96 non-communist countries.” (Landau, pg 786).  When conducting 
his analysis, Landau uses the sample of 96 countries, as he was unsure of the GDP effect of 
including countries that are major oil exporters.  Using general economic growth models 
proposed by Kuznets, Landau was able to fit a comprehensive model, avoiding Benoit’s 
oversimplification pitfall.  Unlike Benoit, Landau’s conclusion is what most economists would 
expect---that heavy defense burdens are associated with lower GDP growth.   
Landau sets the foundation of his research by identifying two major economic schools of 
thought regarding defense burdens and economic growth, being the “free market thinkers” and 
the “Structuralists”.  Moreover, Landau illustrates how divisive the opinions are by stating “a 
believer in the free market would expect government expenditure to be less efficient than private 
even if it was in the field of human capital, and thus he would predict the higher the government 
spending (GS) the lower the growth of GDP (Y).  The “Structuralist School” would contend that 
certain government expenditures have been and will be necessary to remove impediments to 
economic growth, and under certain circumstances, a higher GS would be associated with faster 
growth” (Landau, pg 784).  The ideas proposed in Benoit’s paper regarding Investment Effects 
parallels many of the Free Market schools’ thoughts, however his findings in his 1973 are 
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contradictory to that.  The speculation carefully described in Landau’s work remains in more 
recent research publications on the topic.  
The upcoming section is a description of Landau’s model, for which we will utilize 
Landau’s (1983) notation: 
Overall Regressions4: 
Time Period: 1961-1970 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ̂ =3.97-0.179(GS)-0.0019(Y) +0.0026(TIE) +1.04(Z13) +1.91(Z19)………. (1) 
 (1.69)** (0.87) **    (0.0004)*       (0.004)      (0.55) ***    (0.56)* 
 
 
Time Period: 1961-1972 
𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ̂ =3.77-0.178(GS)-0.0021(Y) +0.028(TIE) +1.08(Z13) +1.67(Z19)………… (2) 
                (1.44)*** (0.074) **   (0.00037) *** (0.0036) *** (0.47) ** (0.48) *** 
Time Period 1961-1974 
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ̂ =4.14-0.188(GS)-.002(Y) +0.027(TIE) +0.751(Z13) +1.23(Z19)…………. (3) 
  (1.31)*** (0.067) ***   (0.00033) *** (0.0033) *** (0.43)* (0.44) *** 
Time Period 1961-1976 
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ̂ =4.25-0.188(GS)-0.0021(Y) +0.026(TIE) +0.432(Z13) +0.604(Z19)…………. (4) 
                              (1.33)***   (0.067) ***   (0.00034) ***   (0.0034) *** (0.45)   (0.46) 
Regressions within Low-Income Countries: 
Time Period 1961-1976 
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ̂ =3.80+0.059(GS)-0.0039(Y) +0.024(TIE) +2.48(Z13) +2.10(Z19)……………… (5) 
  (3.23) (0.091) (0.0021) ***    (0.0057)* (1.37) ***    (0.58)* 
Time Period 1961-1976 
 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ̂ =4.45+0.032(GS)-0.0043(Y) +0.031(TIE) +3.31(Z13) +1.22(Z19)………………. (6) 
  (3.42)        (0.447)       (0.0021) ** (0.005)*   (1.31) **     (0.49) ** 
 GS represents Governement Spending 
 Y represents GDP Growth  
 TIE represents Total Investment in Education 
                                                          
4***= Significant at 0.1, **=Significant at 0.05, *=Significant at 0.01. 
Standard Errors are listed underneath the estimates.  
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 Z13 is a dummy variable for countries in the Mediterranean Climate Zone 
 Z19 is a dummy variable for countries in the Tropical Rain Forest Climate Zone 
Of the four metrics used to stand in for human capital, Total Investment in Education 
(TIE) was the only variable that remained in the final regression model.   Landau uses TIE as a 
variable representing investment in human capital, which is a popular parameter choice.  This 
covariate later becomes a point of contention, since Landau chose to use a constant level of 
education spending, which would go against the “free market” ideology that as government 
spending increases, ceteris paribus, so would other investments, specifically public investment in 
education.  To account for the agrarian nature of low income countries, Landau uses agricultural 
land per capita and a dummy variable that conditions for the climate zone, which greatly affects 
the arability of land. Furthermore, “Marxists and some other development economists contend 
that colonialism or “neo-colonialism” has had serious negative impacts on the growth of the low 
income countries (Landau, pg 786).”   Of these measures Landau chose to represent the fertility 
of land, the only two surviving predictors in the final model5 are Z13 and Z19 are Mediterranean 
and Tropical Rain Forest, respectively.  
The results of the Landau model are quite intriguing, as based on (1), (2), and  (3), a 
country located in a Mediterranean (Z13) climate zone, ceteris paribus, will see positive growth 
as a result of their region.  Similarly, countries in a Tropical Rain Forest (Z19) climate, ceteris 
paribus, will also enjoy positive growth rates due to the degree of arability of the land.  Most 
importantly, though, depending on whether or not a country is considered low-income or not will 
determine the effect of military expenditures on growth.  Overall, as described in equations (1)-
(5), GS is negative, and as increase in military expenditures increases, economic growth falls 
                                                          
5 .  Energy consumption per capita (EC) is used to illustrate the share of industry in GDP, as Landau cites that “the share of 
primary products in exports is a poor indicator of economic growth (Landau, 786).”  Interestingly enough, EC was selected to 
stay in the model after the stepwise procedure, but due to its low statistical significance, Landau removed it from the model. 
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around 0.188%.  In low-income countries, the effect is much smaller, around 0.05%, however, 
both are insignificant. 
One of the most challenging aspects of modeling economic growth in general is the 
simultaneity issue----what causes economic growth and what is a result of economic growth and 
how can we differentiate between the two (Landau, pg 787)?    This problem is mitigated by 
using a two-stages least squares model, which is illustrated in (1), (2), (3), (4), (5),  and (6), 
however, Landau did not describe his use of instrumental variables or the process of his two-
stages model. 
From his regression, Landau was able to conclude that the negative correlation existed for 
all observations except lower income countries as shown in (5) and (6), however, it was 
statistically insignificant.  The one issue in this observation is that he fails to provide a p-value or 
a real basis for why or how these coefficients are statistically insignificant.  However, the level 
and ability to report econometric results has improved within the past 30 years, so Landau may 
have been a victim of the time.  Regardless it is still a peculiar finding and Landau states “they 
are not a solid foundation for strong conclusions because; one, the government share variable is 
only government consumption expenditure, not either total government expenditure or total 
government economic impact; two, government expenditure might help increase economic 
welfare even if it decreases the growth of per capita GDP (Landau, 788)”.   This observation 
points out the free market standpoint, however, it does not dismiss the notion that government 
spending may be beneficial in other non-quantifiable ways.   
This leads well into our analysis of our third major contributor, Robert Barro, whose 
main complaint with previous studies was the lack of exogenous parameters, like the change in 
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technology or population.  He extends on some of the methodology proposed by Landau, 
however he uses the more modern and powerful endogenous growth model. 
 
Early 1990s- CHAPTER 2-3 
Robert Barro’s major contribution came in 1990 with the publication of Government 
Spending in a Simple Model of Endogenous Growth.  His model is greater in complexity than 
Landau’s, but allowed for research development in the new generation, which we will discuss in 
the next chapter.  The foundation of Barro’s model is built on “constant returns to private capital, 
broadly defined to encompass human and nonhuman capital” (Barro, pg 104). While one could 
consider using increasing returns to represent potential positive externalities as a result of 
defense expenditure, primarily research and development, this complicates the long-run and 
steady state interpretation.  Increasing returns to scale in the growth model may also be 
inappropriate, as the scope of Barro’s paper is primarily in developing countries, where R&D is 
unlikely to arise due to higher levels of defense expenditures.   
Using this constant returns to scale, Barro can succinctly identify the production function 
into Cobb-Douglas form, which in this case, maximizes the savings rate.  However, a compelling 
piece of his model, in our particular case, is his outlining of “public services as acting input to 
private goods and services” (Barro, pg 106).  Empirically, this could make the model more 
difficult computationally.  To mitigate this, Barro points out “as long as the government and the 
private sector have the same production functions, the results would be the same if the 
government buys private inputs and does its own production, instead of purchasing only final 
output from the private sector (Barro, pg 106).”   Consequently, with government spending in 
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general, we must be concerned about externalities and public goods, and whether or not one can 
truly label some public services as nonrival.  Barro, amongst other economists in previous 
studies, contend that the public services are nonrival.   Perhaps one of the more beneficial 
features of Barro’s model is that it can be altered to accommodate for rival public service and is 
open for interpretation.  The motivation behind using an endogenous growth model is based on 
the idea that some of the contribution to growth arises from exogenous factors, particularly 
technological advances, which maybe R&D in the military sector, in relation to our work. Barro 
was able to use his endogenous growth model for involving policy implications such as the “size 
of government and savings and growth rates”, but he was also able to apply it to government 
spending and growth rates.   
Barro’s model deviates from Landau in one significant way, the defined level of 
investment in education.  Landau ran his regression using constant investment in education to 
which Barro argues that “one channel for a negative effect of more government on growth 
involves a reduction in investment, the interpretation is different if a component of investment is 
held constant (Barro, pg 122).”  To be more clear, Barro’s chief concern with leaving investment 
in education constant in the model is related back to “investment effects”; if a government 
chooses to divert more funds to defense, other programs or campaigns, like education, will see a 
reduction in funds.  A compelling argument put forth by Barro was that “the growth rate and 
defense expenditures depends largely on how governments behave, and whether or not they 
choose too little (or too much) productive public services, as opposed to optimizing, which 
would produce small cross-sectional correlation (Barro, pg 123).”  The issue is the difficulty in 
predicting how a government may behave and how they should behave and how that may affect 
that country’s economic growth.  
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 It is through these questions asked by Barro that seems to solidify the “free market 
thinkers”, as illustrated by Landau (1983).  Barro falls into our “free market thinker” category 
through his skepticism of the “efficient allocation” of government resources and through the 
belief that an increase in government spending results in the crowding out of other, more 
productive investments.  These topics and the use of dynamic models as proposed by Barro 
marks the beginning of a new approach for modeling the relationship between growth and 
defense expenditures.  His successor and research partner, Xavier Sala-i-Martin, is later able to 
effectively identify and deal with some of the shortcomings acknowledged throughout the “first 
generation”. 
The approaches to studying growth evolved into more complex and econometrically 
involved models since the publication of Barro's (1991) influential work.  This trend continues 
on to present day, even as we discover more about the implications of higher defense spending 
on growth and other aspects of economic measures.  In this section, we consider more 
contemporaneous works done by Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Giorgio d’Agostino and Casey Borch and 
Michael Wallace.  These authors represent the “new generation” of economists representing the 
relationship between growth and defense spending.  
 
CHAPTER 3: THE NEW GENERATION 
MID TO LATE 1990’s- CHAPTER 3-1 
 We begin our analysis of modern growth models with Xavier Sala-i-Martin and his 
famous 1997 paper, “I Just Ran Two Million Regressions”.  With a catchy title, this paper is 
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actually founded on many of Robert Barro’s papers, including the paper we discussed in the 
previous chapter.  
To address this problem, Sala-i-Martin compiles 60 variables which have proved 
statistically significant in at least one regression (Sala-i-Martin, pg 178). On that note, a similar 
issue arises when one has included a set of predictors, but as more are added, some remain 
significant, while others do not, and as Sala-i-Martin says “what are the variables that are really 
correlated with growth (Sala-i-Martin, 178)?”  This question was examined by Levine and Renelt 
(1985), and in this case, they employ a “robustness” test explained in Leamer (1985); This test 
determines how closely related or “robust” a chosen set of predictor variables are to the response 
variable. Levine and Renelt (1992) show that none of their predictors involving an economic 
growth model “passed” the robustness test.  They are not the only ones who have utilized this 
statistical tool, and, in fact, some economists claim that there are no predictors for economic 
growth that are “robust”.  
However, Sala-i-Martin contends that “the test is too strong for any variable to pass it 
(Sala-i-Martin, 179).”  Thus, Sala-i-Martin abandons this robustness test entirely, and relies on 
using confidence levels instead.   
 With a total of 62 variables located in previous literature as being statistically significant, 
the permeating issue of predictor specification arises.  As noted by both Sala-i-Martin and some 
his predecessors, including Barro, the general consensus for growth modeling includes no less 
than seven predictors.  Some covariates should be included in groups, and, as indicated, by Sala-
i-Martin, if he were to choose 6 predictors out of the 61, allowing one variable to remain in each 
regression, he would be estimating 3.4 billion regressions in a total of 4 years (Sala-i-Martin, 
pg180)!  Thus, Sala-i-Martin used the same regression approach as Levine and Renelt (1985), 
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however abandoning their model selection tools, and kept 3 covariates fixed in each regression, 
and chose 4 more from the remaining 59 variables, which turns out to be 30,856 regressions per 
covariate for a total of 2 million regressions, hence the title of his paper (Sala-i-Martin, pg 180).  
 The first significant question is, which three covariates should always be present in the 
model?  Sala-i-Martin pulls upon prior literature to make his final decision, which includes the 
three following covariates: level of income, life expectancy, and primary-school enrollment rate, 
along with the dependent variable, growth, all from 1960 to minimize endogeneity. Below is the 
table that include only statistically significant predictors or predictors that Sala-i-Martin found 
close to normal.  
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Table 3-1: Sala-i-Martin Results (Dependent Variable = GDP Growth) 
Independent Variable (i) 
Coefficient 
(β) 
(ii) 
Standard 
Deviation** 
Equipment investment 0.2175** 0.0408 
Number of years 
Open economy 
 
0.01985** 0.0042 
Fraction Confucian 0.0676** 0.0149 
Rule of Law 0.0190** 0.0049 
Fraction Muslim 0.0142** 0.0035 
Political Rights 
 
-0.0026** 0.0009 
Latin America Dummy 
 
-0.0115** 0.0029 
Sub-Saharan Africa Dummy 
 
-0.0118** 0.0045 
Civil Liberties -0.0029** 0.0010 
Revolutions and coups -0.0140** 0.0053 
Fraction of GDP in mining 
 
0.0353** 0.0138 
SD black-market premium -0.0290** 0.0118 
Primary exports in 1970 -0.0140** 0.0053 
Degree of Capitalism 0.0018** 0.0008 
War dummy -0.0056** 0.0023 
Non-equipment investment 0.562** 0.0242 
Absolute latitude 0.0002** 0.0001 
Exchange-rate distortions -0.0590** 0.0302 
Fraction Protestant -0.0129** 0.0053 
Fraction Buddhist 0.0148** 0.0076 
Fraction Catholic -0.0089** 0.0034 
Spanish colony -0.0065** 0.0032 
Note: ***= Significant at 0.1, ** = Significant at 0.05, *= Significant at 0.01 
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From Table 3-1, we see that government spending or defense expenditures are not included.  
Sala-i-Martin mentions that “they are not in the table because they appear to not be important: no 
measure of government spending (including investment) appears to affect growth in a significant 
way…” (Sala-i-Martin, pg 183). However, Sala-i-Martin leaves this disclaimer “in fairness to the 
authors who proposed these variables, I should say that they specifically say that they affect 
growth in non-linear ways, and my analysis allowed these variables to enter in a linear fashion 
only” (Sala-i-Martin, pg 183).  At the same time, the War Dummy Variable is still significant, 
and has a value of -0.0056, meaning that all other things equal, growth will fall by 0.0056 if there 
is an ongoing war.  It is also interesting to note that growth will fall by -0.0140 if the country is 
undergoing a revolution or coup.  Granted, it is difficult to make a final assessment on the 
strength and magnitude of these results, as Sala-i-Martin makes no note of what the average GDP 
growth rate is for his selected countries.  Because military expenditures are found to be 
statistically insignificant in this case, Sala-i-Martin falls into neither the Structuralist nor Free 
Market thinker category.   
THE NEW MILLENNIUM: CHAPTER 3-2 
 The next section will focus on the 2010 paper “The Defense-Growth Relationship: An 
Economic Investigation into Post-Soviet States”, by Bruce McDonald and Robert Eger. 
McDonald and Eger’s 2010 paper focuses on transitional economies, which encompasses a 
country that is undergoing the change from a centrally planned economy to a market economy.  
McDonald and Eger’s paper has important implications as it emphasizes the need and use of 
lagging and fixed effects models.  These topics will be discussed further on in this section.  
Many of these economies had high defense burdens, due to their location along the “Iron 
Curtain”.  McDonald and Eger even state that “much research on the Soviet Union has agreed 
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that such high levels of defense spending strained the economy and helped bring the country to 
an end sooner than it might have in other circumstances” (McDonald, Eger,pg 1).  The 
relationship between military expenditures and growth in transitional economies is more blurred 
than those of developing or developed economies, as fewer studies have been conducted.    
A predominant issue in the literature is the reliability of data, particularly for developing 
and transitional economies.  Many transitional economies have questionable data due to the 
former regime’s interest in keeping economic indicators inflated. McDonald and Eger’s main 
source of data is from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)’s World 
Armaments and Disarmaments Yearbook (McDonald, Eger, pg 12).  Some estimates proved 
unreliable, or were missing, and in those cases, McDonald and Eger called upon the World Bank 
to make up for the holes in the data.  The only post-Soviet country to be completely excluded 
from the analysis is Turkmenistan, on the grounds of poor data availability.  
Upon the basis of previous literature, McDonald and Eger opt to employ a non-linear 
least squares method and ultimately decide on a fixed effects model at the country level.   One 
key feature of their analysis is the presence of lags, “as the impact of defense spending on 
economic growth tends to include a delayed effect (McDonald, Eger, pg 14). The lag in 
McDonald and Eger’s 2010 paper is set to two years.  The choice of lag is debatable, as it may 
take longer than two years to see any effects as a result of the military spending.  However, given 
the shorter time span of the data, a two year lag is chosen (McDonald, Eger, pg 14).  The fear in 
using lags, however, is the presence of serial correlation.  McDonald and Eger test for this using 
a modified non-linear Durbin-Watson test, which is a metric used to determine the severity and 
direction of autocorrelation.  The results showed no evidence of serial correlation.  
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McDonald and Eger break their non-linear least squares models into two categories; that 
is the direct and indirect6 impact of defense spending on the post-Soviet economy.  To be 
precise, the direct effects encompass a model that tests the relationship between various 
covariates and GDP growth.  The indirect effects are models that are broken down further into 
two separate models; a model representing the relationship between the covariates and the 
investment ratio, and a model representing the relationship between the covariates and total 
unemployment.  By splitting the analysis into direct and indirect effects, the effects of military 
expenditures can be refined into specific areas of the economy. (See Table 3-2 on next page) 
                                                          
6 The indirect impact of defense spending encompasses two models, one that captures the effect of defense 
expenditures on investment, and another on employment.  These are important to look at, since Benoit (1973) 
suggested that increasing defense burdens may be beneficial to employment. 
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Table 3-2: Direct Impact of Defense Spending on the post-Soviet Economy 
Variable Coefficient t-
Statistic 
Model: Economic Growth 
    Dependent Variable: GDP 
 
  
λ est. -0.3545*** -3.03 
ψ1 0.0764 0.92 
ψk 0.2969*** 2.49 
πd 4.0031*** 2.89 
ψd -0.0084 -0.29 
πn 
 
  1.6848***    7.18 
ψn      0.358*** 2.34 
Fixed effects for year and country 
R
2
 = 0.8007 
N = 210 
Yes  
   
Labor Effect (e
λt
) 0.0270  
Investment Effect (e
λt
 ψk) 0.1052  
Defense Growth Effect (πd(D/Y)+ (e
λt
 ψd) 0.0760  
Defense Size Effect (λπd) 
 
1.4193  
Non-Defense Growth Effect (πn(n/Y)+ (e
λt
 ψn) 0.2886  
Non-Defense Size Effect (λπn) 0.5973  
Note: * Significance at 0.1 
          ** Significance at 0.05 
         *** Significance at 0.01  
Table 3-2 summarizes the direct effects, that is the model representing military 
expenditure’s relationship with the coefficients as described below: 
 λ represents technology 
 πd represents the productivity of the defense sector 
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 ψi represents the externality effect of the defense spending 
 Subscript n refers to non-defense government sectors 
 Subscript k refers to any individual post-Soviet State 
 Subscript d refers to defense 
 Subscript t represents the base year, 2000 
Upon first perusal of the table, the results are contradictory, with a positive coefficient on 
the productivity of the defense sector and a negative coefficient on the externality effect of 
defense spending. The opposing association between these covariates leads McDonald and Eger 
to calculate the elasticity of total economic output, with respect to defense and non-defense 
spending, as labeled in the above table as Defense Growth Effect and Non-Defense Growth 
Effect. These “real effects” allow for a better comprehension and interpretation of the results. 
“Inferring from the additional calculations, a one percent increase in defense spending within the 
post-Soviet states is expected to increase the state’s economic growth by about 0.08 percent, and 
a one percent increase in the ratio of defense spending to GDP will promote economic growth by 
1.42 percent (McDonald, Eger, pg 17).”   A one percent increase in non-defense spending will 
also increase economic growth by about 0.6 percent.  The results of the direct model are 
consistent with the Structuralist school, as in this case, higher amounts of defense spending are 
associated with higher levels of economic growth.  
 The following two tables summarize the results of the indirect effects models, that is, the 
models that use Investment and Total Unemployment as response variables, respectively. 
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Table 3-3: Indirect Impact of Defense Spending on the post-Soviet 
Economy 
Variable Coefficient t-
Statistic 
Model: Investment 
 
  
Constant 0.0551*** 3.68 
Private Sectort 0.1287*** 3.78 
Private Sectort-1 0.0751*** 2.42 
Private Sectort-2 0.0380* 1.39 
Defense Spendingt -0.0954 -0.17 
Defense Spendingt-1 
 
-0.2882 -0.60 
Defense Spendingt-2 -0.4025 -0.95 
Non-Defense Government Spendingt 0.2763*** 2.33 
Non-Defense Government Spendingt-1  -0.1427* -1.35 
Non-Defense Government Spendingt-2 -0.1448* -1.50 
Capital Stockt-1 0.5513*** 7.54 
Fixed effects for year and country Yes  
R
2 
= 0.4905 
N =168 
  
Note: * Significance at 0.1 
          ** Significance at 0.05 
          *** Significance at 0.01 
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Table 3-4: Indirect Impact of Defense Spending on the post-Soviet Economy 
Variable Coefficient t-Statistic 
Model: Total Unemployment 
 
  
Constant 7.1523*** 5.52 
Unemploymentt-1 0.7484*** 9.88 
Unemployment-2 -0.1191** -1.85 
Defense Spendingt 0.0292 0.38 
Defense Spendingt-1 
 
-0.0179 -0.19 
Defense Spendingt-2 -0.0204 -0.32 
Non-Defense Government Spendingt -0.3152*** -3.61 
Non-Defense Government Spendingt-1  0.2324*** 2.93 
Non-Defense Government Spendingt-2 -0.0006*** -2.03 
Fixed effects for year and country Yes  
R
2 
= 0.8454 
N =182 
  
Note: * Significance at 0.1 
          ** Significance at 0.05 
          *** Significance at 0.01 
 
 Analyzing Table 3-3, the Investment model, first, it is important to note that 
defense spending, regardless of the lag, is statistically insignificant and negative.  Non-defense 
spending is initially beneficial to investment, but as time goes on, crowding out becomes an 
issue.  These results are not surprising given how active the private sector is in its contribution to 
investment as a whole.  
For Table 3-4, the Total Unemployment model, defense spending has a positive but 
insignificant coefficient.  In the following two years, defense spending turns negative, while still 
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insignificant.  This is contrary to Benoit (1973), who claimed that defense spending may have a 
positive effect on economic growth.  Non-defense spending is statistically significant throughout 
all time periods, however the sign switches from t to t-1.  As pointed out by McDonald and Eger, 
because the magnitude of these coefficients are roughly the same, the effect of non-defense 
spending may cancel itself out over time.   
 The implications of McDonald and Eger’s work is compelling as military expenditures 
has a different impact on GDP, investment, and total unemployment.  The first model, or the 
direct effects model using GDP as the response, showed a positive relationship between defense 
expenditures and growth.  Conversely, both indirect models using investment and total 
unemployment as response variables, respectively, showed mostly negative and insignificant 
relationships. In this case, McDonald and Eger simultaneously are in the Structuralist school, 
given their contention of a positive relationship in the direct effects model, and the insignificant 
group, since the indirect effects showed no statistical relationship. To elaborate further on the 
indirect effects model, McDonald and Eger state “in the short term, non-defense spending 
promotes investment, but the effect does not last into the following years. Regarding 
employment, non-defense spending reduces total unemployment in the short term, but increases 
it in the long run (McDonald, Eger, pg 20).” 
2010 ONWARD: CHAPTER 3-3 
 Casey Borch and Michael Wallace take a different approach than Sala-i-Martin and many 
other of their predecessors in the sense that their 2010 paper “Military Spending and Economic 
Well-Being in the American States: The Post-Vietnam War Era” focuses on the developed world. 
These are the cases in which it would be more likely to see potential positive externalities, as 
mentioned earlier, such as the external effects generated by research and development activities 
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or more employment opportunities. To support this hypothesis, Borch and Wallace (2010) 
frequently reference Groton, Connecticut, which is endearingly referred to as the “Submarine 
Capital of the World” (Borch, Wallace, pg 2) 
 In their 2010 paper, Borch and Wallace highlight a key characteristic of the United States 
throughout the Cold War period, which they have identified as “military Keynesianism”, which 
parallels the “Structuralists” as described by Landau (1983).  As cited by Baran and Sweezy in 
their 1966 paper, “if military spending were reduced once again to pre-Second World War 
proportions, the nation’s economy would return to a state of profound depression, characterized 
by unemployment rates of 12 percent and up” ( Borch, Wallace, pg 1727).  More importantly, it 
is also argued that “government officials use military spending as a countercyclical tool to avoid 
recession, reduce unemployment, and stimulate economic growth (Borch, Wallace, pg 1727).  
Borch and Wallace also contend that this emphasis on military Keynesianism tends to “focus on 
the cause of military spending as opposed to the outcome” (Borch, Wallace, pg 1730).  This 
distinction becomes important as they build their model. 
 The data is pulled from 1977-2004 from 497 states.  This time period includes crucial 
historical moments, such as the fall of the Soviet Union, and more importantly, the multiple 
terrorist attacks that occurred in New York, Pennsylvania, and Washington D.C. on the morning 
of September 11th, 2001.  These terrorist attacks mark an important date since military build-up 
in the United States increased dramatically in the years following.   
The modeling technique employed by Borch and Wallace is unlike any of the other 
papers that we have discussed in the sense that they chose a “growth curve” model, which is a 
                                                          
7 Borch and Wallace made no mention of which state was left out of the analysis. 
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statistical modeling method used to estimate positive or negative growth trajectories.  Multiple 
generalized models are run for each state, which may or may not have different trajectories.  Like 
McDonald and Eger, Borch and Wallace also utilized lags, however they chose a one year lag, 
instead. From this repeated modeling process, Borch and Wallace were able to draw conclusions 
across different states, and across different metrics including: median family income, income 
inequality, and unemployment rates.   
The following tables summarize the results based on their growth trajectory.  Table 3-5 
shows the “initial status’ of the variable, which is “the main effect coefficient represents the 
average effect of the independent variable at the first point in time (Borch, Wallace, pg 11).” 
Table 3-6 represent the growth curve model with a linear trajectory.   Furthermore, Table 
3-6 breaks down military spending into various components, such as personnel and non-
personnel.  This distinction is important, as the relationship between the different types of 
military spending may make a different on the final conclusion. 
For both tables, the X corresponds to a dummy variable that was used for certain models. 
For example, in Table 3-5, the X South corresponds to a dummy variable for the % of Black 
citizens in the South within the Median Family Income model.   
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Table 3-5: Results of Model Tests of Four Measure of Economic Well Being 
Fixed Effects Unemployment Rate Median Family Income (2000) Income Equality Poverty Rate 
INITIAL STATUS Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. 
Error 
Intercept 6.471* (7.26) 50.463*** (27.8) 38.818*** (36.9) 12.983* (9.42) 
South 1.835** (3.24) -2.775 (1.24) 4.27*** (3.58) -4.446*** (2.86) 
Post Cold War 
(1990-00) 
.152 (0.95) -0.571 (1.92) 0.163 (0.75) 0.438*** (1.98) 
Post 9/11 (2001-04) 0.890* (3.42) -1.276** (2.61) -0.467 (1.37) 0.854*** (2.10) 
%Δ GDP per capita 
(t-1) 
-0.291* (15.5) 0.411* (11.7) 0.058* (2.32) -0.236* (8.71) 
%Δ Aggregate 
concentration 
0.123* (3.59) -1.246* (7.11) -0.009 (0.19) 0.583* (4.47) 
Inflation (t-1) -0.278* (12.0) 0.385* (8.00) -0.069** (2.77) -0.156* (5.85) 
% College graduates 0.019 (1.10) -0.029 (0.73) 0.011 (0.41) -0.073** (2.76) 
% Black -.000 (0.02) 0.471** (2.82) 0.140* (4.67) 0.164** (3.08) 
X South ----  -0.526** (2.70) ----  ----  
Residential 
population/1,000 
0.047*** (2.28) -0.201 (1.45) 0.105** (2.60) 0.273* (5.12) 
% Democrats in state 
government 
-0.009*** (2.02) 0.043* (3.79) -0.008 (1.06) -0.050* (4.75) 
X South ----  ----  ----  0.084* (5.17) 
Democratic governor -0.564* (3.69) -0.034 (0.23) -0.206 (1.94) -0.117 (1.13) 
Manufacturing/GSP -0.007 (0.35) -0.086*** (2.35) -0.007 (0.35) 0.102* (3.92) 
% Employed in large 
establishment 
-0.032 (1.58) 0.064 (1.20) -0.138* (3.67) -0.208* (6.32) 
X South ----  ----  -0.181** (3.24) ----  
# Fortune 500 firms (log) 0.104 (1.06) 0.311 (1.34) 0.037 (0.25) -0.839* (4.41) 
X South ----  ----  ----  0.965** (3.23) 
Union Density 0.049** (2.87) 0.086* (2.03) 0.045*** (1.98) 0.045 (1.64) 
Non-defense/GSP (t-1) 0.261* (8.16) -0.550* (11.8) 0.092** (3.10) 0.301* (7.18) 
Defense contracts/GSP 
(t-1) 
0.032 (0.54) -0.216 (1.67) -0.096 (1.17) 0.123 (1.35) 
Defense personnel/ GSP 
(t-1) 
-0.190* (2.29) 0.294 (1.34) -0.034 (0.33) 0.101 (0.75) 
* Significant at 0.1, ** Significant at 0.05, ***Significant at 0.01 
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Table  3-6: Linear Growth Trajectory  
Covariate Unemployment  
Rate 
Median Family Income 
(2000) 
Income Inequality Poverty Rate 
Trend(Linear) -0.137* (4.04) 0.843* (12.7) 0.56 (1.18) 0.356* (5.26) 
X South -0.040** (2.70) ----  ----  ----  
X %Δ Aggregate Concentration ----  0.083* (8.98) ----  -0034* (4.94) 
X Inflation (t-1) 0.009** (2.97) -0.051* (8.15) ----  ----  
X % Black 
 
----  ----  -0.002* (1.99) 0.003** (2.80) 
X % Democrats in state 
 government 
----  ----  ----  0.002** (3.17) 
X Democratic governor 0.039* (4.23) ----  ----  ----  
X Manufacturing/ GSP -0.002*** (2.05) ----  ----  -0.006* (5.26) 
X % Employed in large 
 establishment 
----  ----  0.009*** (4.14) ----  
X Union density ----  -0.010** (3.24) ----  ----  
X Non-defense/ GSP (t-1)  -0.007* (5.14) ----  ----  -0.012* (6.16) 
X Contracts/GSP (t-1) -0.006** (2.02) 0.029** (2.86) -0.014***  (2.25) -0.025*** (2.07) 
X Personnel/ GSP (t-1) ----  -0.045** (2.70) ----  -0.008* (4.63) 
Note: * Significant at 0.1, ** Significant at 0.05, *** Significant at 0.01 
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The conclusions drawn from Borch and Wallace’s analysis proved surprising for all three 
responses8. Starting with the median family income model in Table 3-6, Borch and Wallace 
reported that “neither coefficient [referring to the military spending variables], was significant at 
the 0.05 level, suggesting that the average level of military spending in the state does not affect 
median family income at the first time point” (Borch, Wallace, pg 1741). However, when taking 
into account the lag, Borch and Wallace disaggregate their interpretation of military spending 
into spending on defense personnel and spending on defense contracts9, which is illustrated in 
table 3-6.  From this, Borch and Wallace contend that “there is a positive and significant10 
relationship between spending on contracts and median family income (Borch, Wallace, pg 
1741).” Moreover, Borch and Wallace claim that “military spending staves off the deleterious 
effects of deindustrialization on economic well-being (Borch, Wallace, pg 1743).”   
 The implications of Borch and Wallace’s 2010 paper provides support of their “military 
Keynesianism” hypothesis and the “Structuralist” school, including Emile Benoit, they make a 
definitive argument for disaggregating military spending into spending on personnel and defense 
contracts.   An important distinction among the 2010 paper is the emphasis on short-term effects 
of military spending in the United States.  This opens further avenues of research for those 
interested in “constant War State” and long-term consequences of defense spending.  
                                                          
8 That is, the models that had the response variable set as median family income, income inequality, and 
unemployment.  
9 This distinction is important as defense contracts are carried through the private sector, whereas spending on 
personnel is completely within the public sector.  
10 Signifcant at the 0.01 level.  
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 The final paper we will discuss is the 2014 paper, “Does Military Spending Stimulate 
Growth? An Empirical Investigation in Italy”, by Giorgio d’Agostino.  The motivations and 
theoretical framework was inspired by Barro (1991).  The theoretical model that d’Agostino 
implemented is an extension of the endogenous growth model as outlined in the previous chapter 
and is different in the sense that d’Agostino explicitly defines military expenditures as one of his 
covariates.   
 The data comes from a combination of the Italian government and NATO, due to their 
outlining of military expenditures. As described by d’Agostino, the definition of defense 
expenditures varies from country and unilateral organizations.  Moreover, NATO defines 
defense spending as “all current and capital expenditure on armed forces, peacekeeping forces, 
Defense Ministry and other government agencies engaged in defense projects, paramilitary 
forces available for military operations, and military space activities” (d’Agostino, pg 6).  The 
Italian government does not specify “peacekeeping missions and paramilitary forces” as defense 
spending, therefore, this distinction becomes important throughout d’Agostino’s analysis, as 
these figures differ greatly. 
 d’Agostino addresses a different and relatively unexplored idea, that is, how the 
household is affected by an external threat, such as terrorism or war.  The impact on an economy 
due a perceived external military threat is a good reason to use the endogenous growth model.  
d’Agostino is careful to add lags to account for the fact that there may be a delay in when the 
change in GDP is observed.  From his preliminary analysis, d’Agostino states that “military 
burden has significant effects on economic growth, promoting “productively” peacekeeping and 
humanitarian missions which reduces the insecurity from the external threat (d’Agostino, pg 
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17)”.  This has interesting implications for nations who both give and receive funding for 
peacekeeping missions.  
 
CHAPTER 4: DATA 
 A continuing issue in economics is the reliability of the data, particularly economic 
indicators from formerly authoritarian governments.  We collected data on Percentage of GDP 
growth per year, Military Expenditures as a percentage of GDP per year, and NATO membership 
on 18 Eastern European countries 11 over the course of years from 1988-2014, from three major 
sources, the World Bank, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), and 
NATO, respectively.  Our main focus will remain on formerly Communist countries in Eastern 
Europe. 
4-1: WHY SIPRI?  
 While the choice of the World Bank and NATO as sources for data seem natural, for 
some, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) is relatively unknown.  To 
give a comprehensive background, SIPRI was formed in 1966 with support of the Swedish 
Parliament to encourage further research in the area of defense and peace economics.   “The 
SIPRI yearbook, entitled World Armaments and Disarmament, also includes very detailed 
statistics on arms trade and national defense industries, as well as abundant analytical studies 
concerned with the most recent political and strategic events (Herrera, pg 33).” Our values for 
military expenditures as a percent of GDP come from the Military Expenditure database.  
                                                          
11 Our countries include the following:  Belarus, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Ukraine. 
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Furthermore, the motivation for using SIPRI is further solidified in that “the definition of 
military expenditure adopted by SIPRI corresponds to the NATO reference classification, the 
standard definition of which is broken down schematically into: capital expenditure (including 
equipment of major importance, missiles, and infrastructures); and operating expenditure 
(including the cost of military personnel, purchases of munitions and explosives, supplies and 
consumables, and other defense expenditures.) (Herrera, 33).” 
 As previously illustrated by d’Agostino and other economists, it is paradigm that each 
institution’s definition of defense spending is consistent across all sources of data.  
4-2: Methodology 
 Our methodology is inspired significantly from the work of Xavier Sala-i-Martin.  The 
goal of our analysis is to examine the relationship between percent of GDP growth and military 
expenditures as a percentage of GDP and NATO membership.  As pointed out in Chapter 2-3 in 
the description of Landau, our hypothesis is consistent with the “Free Market Thinkers” and that 
for our sample of 18 Eastern European (as listed in a footnote on the last page) countries, we 
expect to see a negative relationship between our covariates, namely, military expenditure as a 
percent of GDP and NATO membership, and our response, GDP growth.  Our hypothesis 
coincides with the Free Market Thinkers given the history of these previously authoritarian 
countries. 
For an interesting and informative view on the Soviet Union, a detailed book published in 
1991 by Eugene Keefe can be referenced.   Throughout the Soviet Union’s history, along with 
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the Republics and Satellites12, many of these countries opted for the “largest” and most 
threatening military, granted, the quality of such military was lacking.  Artillery and tanks were 
built for the sake of building tanks, along with giving the country’s citizens work13.  With that 
being said, there were likely better uses of these capital and human inputs, and that many of 
these countries are still recovering from the negative effects of maintaining a poorly designed 
and executed military.  This would align with the Free Market Thinkers.  
The following table represents the summary statistics on our countries.   
 Y represents GDP growth 
 ME represents Military Expenditures as a percentage of GDP  
                                                          
12 As mentioned in Keefe’s book and other historical sources, a Soviet “Republic” refers to a country that was 
essentially annexed by the USSR and deemed an auxiliary administrative center.  “Satellites refer to a country 
surrounding the Soviet Union that were not part of the Soviet Union but strongly influenced by the USSR.  One 
could call them a Soviet “Puppet State”.   
13 Please reference Policy Analysis: Perestroika and the Soviet Military: Implications for U.S. Policy by Edward A. 
Corcoran for a more descriptive view on the Soviet Military.  
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Table 4-1: Summary Statistics 
Country Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Belarus ME      22       1.6069        0.5555       1.1981        3.6216 
Y      24        3.1517        6.9275      -11.7       11.449 
Bosnia-Herzogovina ME 12 1.5901 0.8295 1.1030 3.9043 
Y 27 1.4486 5.2026 -9.117 10.944 
Bulgaria ME 25 2.5339 0.63758 1.54831 4.3963 
Y 20 11.0671 20.1722 -2.8698 88.9576 
Croatia ME 22 4.3573 3.4138 1.6496 11.1481 
Y 19 2.0373 3.6494 -7.383 6.6454 
Czech Republic ME 21 1.6831 0.3662 1.0496 2.3304 
Y 24 1.703 3.9885 -11.6149 6.8765 
Estonia ME 21 1.5559 0.4512 0.7617 2.2708 
Y 19 4.4221 6.2267 -14.7244 11.7986 
Hungary ME      26        1.7491        0.6873      0.9299       3.8032 
Y      23        1.8391         2.8255     -6.5591       4.9377 
Latvia ME 21 1.6520 0.6162 0.8645 2.6360 
Y 19 4.3511 6.2186 -14.3489 11.9021 
Lithuania ME 21 0.9671 0.2736 0.4523 1.3656 
Y 19 4.5322 5.5704 -14.8141 11.0869 
Macedonia ME 18 2.2264 1.1981 1.2377 6.5839 
Y 24 1.2608 3.9283 -7.4692 6.4734 
Moldova 
 
ME 21 0.5211 0.1985 0.3155 0.9259 
Y 27 -0.5122 10.2999 -30.9 9.3968 
Montenegro ME 17 2.4402 4.8434 -9.3999 10.6579 
Y 24 1.703 3.9885 -11.6149 6.8765 
Poland ME 8 1.8202 0.2330 1.4988 2.3128 
Y 24 3.678 2.1940 -7.0155 7.2016 
Romania ME 26 2.0129 0.2315 1.7659 2.6124 
Y 24 1.7593 5.5888 -12.9182 8.4589 
Serbia ME 26 2.5758 1.1257 1.2659 4.7597 
Y 19 2.8178 4.9349 -12.1465 9.0465 
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Slovakia ME 21 1.7716 0.5508 1.0005 10.834 
Y 22 4.072 3.3599 -5.4913 10.8344 
Slovenia ME 22 1.4559 0.2552 1.0549 2.2472 
Y 19 2.5572 3.4011 -7.7972 6.9416 
Ukraine ME 21 2.7646 0.6819 0.4653 4.1246 
Y 27 -1.2027 8.7639 -22.9341 12.1 
 
4-3: MODEL 
 We chose to implement an OLS regression along with a year lag for all of our values.  A 
greater lag may be more appropriate in other cases, however, given the short time period for 
which we have data, we selected the year lag. Our model framework is set up as the following: 
(4-1)………..𝑌𝑖?̂? = ?̂?0(𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1) + ?̂?1(𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡−1) + ?̂?3(𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 ∗ 𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡−1) 
The terminology for the model is as follows: 
 Y  represents % of GDP growth 
 ME represents Military Expenditures as a percentage of GDP  
 The variable, NATO, is a dummy variable coded as 0 or 1, 1 for NATO membership and 
0 for otherwise.  
 Subscript i refers to country 
 Subscript t refers to time 
The interaction between ME and NATO is included to further analyze how NATO 
membership affects growth.  This is an important distinction because member countries must 
comply with the limitations on military spending set forth by NATO. At first glance, it is 
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difficult to assess what the relationship with the interaction between ME and NATO might 
be. 
We also compare correlations between ME and GDP growth controlling for NATO status 
and NATO and GDP growth controlling for ME for a general idea of the relationships.   
Looking at the relationship between ME and GDP growth, most countries exhibited positive 
relationships, however, many were statistically insignificant, or at best, marginally 
significant.   However, this relationship may change as we add NATO and our NATO 
interaction into the model.  It is also likely that there are effects that ME is not capturing and 
could be seen using a combination of other predictors, likely missing variables that may be 
correlated to ME and then yielding biased results of the relationship between ME and Y.  The 
following table summarizes the results of the correlation between ME and GDP growth.   
Table 4-2: Correlations between ME and Y ignoring NATO status 
Country Covariate Coefficient Std. Error 
Belarus 
 
Constant 16.988* 3.2664* 
ME -8.1268* 1.9258* 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Constant 0.3492 2.2982 
ME 1.8467 1.2930 
Bulgaria Constant -7.9612 26.67 
ME 8.1854 11.3049 
Croatia Constant 0.5153 1.3486 
ME 0.4356 0.30759 
Czech Republic Constant -5.1437 2.5422 
  ME 4.5538*** 1.4775 
Estonia Constant 14.1962** 5.5958 
ME -6.0145* 3.3425 
Hungary Constant 1.1749 2.3723 
ME 0.0575 1.4743 
Latvia Constant 5.8481 4.3792 
ME -0.8764 2.4166 
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* Significant at 0.1, ** Significant at 0.05, *** Significant at 0.01 
 
 From Table 4-2, we can see that most of the correlations are insignificant.  Sorting the 
countries based on their NATO status did not seem to change this relationship much.  
Unfortunately, many of these correlations remain statistically insignificant. 
4-4: ANALYSIS 
In order to scrutinize the results, we run several models with and without the fixed effects 
with a lag, given by expressions (4-2) and (4-3) located below, respectively. Given what has 
Lithuania Constant 5.8231 5.3261 
ME -1.2906 5.1605 
Macedonia  Constant 3.2126 1.2637 
ME -0.1415 0.5029 
Moldova Constant 11.1634** 5.1974 
ME -18.8498* 9.3479 
Montenegro Constant -14.5130 14.8007 
ME 9.3619 8.0733 
Poland Constant 11.8583** 5.5414 
ME -4.0881 2.7542 
Romania Constant 7.8979*** 2.7365 
ME -2.5427** 1.0491 
Serbia Constant -0.8087 4.0751 
ME 1.0483 1.1985 
Slovakia Constant 0.1284 2.4410 
ME 2.28429* 1.3184 
Slovenia Constant 2.0772 7.0713 
ME 0.34663 5.07336 
Ukraine Constant -19.712 7.2049 
ME 7.1260 2.5337 
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been suggested in previous studies, the use of lags tends to give a better fit, as we would not 
expect changes in GDP growth to happen immediately.  It is also paradigm to use a fixed effects 
model to analyze each country.  While each country was either a former Soviet Republic or a 
member of the Iron Curtain, each country has its own specific characteristics that may or may 
not change the relationship with the covariate.  Previous literature all seems to support the use of 
fixed effects.  For this reason, our final model, as described in tables below, is a fixed effects 
model with a one year lag.  Table 4-3 describes fixed effects by country and year. 
(4-2)………………..?̂?𝑖𝑡−1 = ?̂?𝑖 + 𝛼?̂? + ?̂?1(𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1) + ?̂?2(𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡−1) + ?̂?3(𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 ∗
𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡−1) 
(4-3)………………. ?̂?𝑖𝑡−1 = ?̂?𝑖 + 𝛼?̂? + ?̂?1(𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1) + ?̂?2(𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡−1) + ?̂?3(𝑀𝐸𝑖𝑡−1 ∗
𝑁𝐴𝑇𝑂𝑖𝑡−1) 
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Table 4-3: Fixed Effects Model lagged by One Year 
Country Coefficient Std. Error Year1 Coefficient Std. Error 
Belarus ----  1993 4.1661 3.7243 
Bosnia -2.5393 2.3138 1994 7.3622 3.7537** 
Bulgaria 5.0997 1.908*** 1995 9.02725 3.3238* 
Croatia  --4.8805 2.1199** 1996 24.9508 3.3197* 
Czech Republic -3.155 2.1477 1997 8.3328 2.667* 
Estonia -1.681 1.9699 1998 1.9203 2.1521 
Hungary -6.2909 2.0828* 1999 0.57494 2.0777 
Latvia -0.6305 1.957 2000 2.9785 2.0437 
Lithuania -2.9079 2.0547 2001 2.6701 1.9886 
Macedonia  -3.3642 1.9394*** 2002 3.5144 1.9596*** 
Moldova -1.9932 1.8384 2003 4.2972 1.9494** 
Montenegro -2.8227 3.0268 2004 5.157 1.8474* 
Poland -2.9360 2.0199 2005 4.6501 1.8465* 
Romania -0.4612 2.2448 2006 5.6008 1.8567* 
Serbia -3.0859 2.0712 2007 5.6902 1.8241* 
Slovakia -2.2744 1.9801 2008 2.5283 1.8196 
2009 -7.8755 1.8111* 
Slovenia -4.4652 1.9810** 2010 0.7712 1.8112 
2011 1.8991 1.7776 
Ukraine -3.3182 1.8491*** 2012 -1.2030 1.7755 
2013 0.3707 1.7747 
 Coefficient Std. Error    
ME 0.00000165 0.0000331    
NATO 6.9685 2.4841*    
ME*NATO -0.004183 0.0001009*    
Constant 3.6938 1.8386**    
*** Significant at 0.1, ** Significant at 0.05, * Significant at 0 
                                                          
1 1989-1992 and 2014 were omitted from the analysis on the grounds of collinearity. 
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Table 4-3 has some compelling results to take note of.   Belarus was also omitted from 
the model due to multicollinearity issues.   We can see that ME coefficient was positive, albeit 
incredibly small, but also statistically insignificant.  The NATO dummy is positive but is also 
statistically insignificant.  The sign of the NATO dummy is opposite of what we had initially 
expected, although one can argue, as mentioned in the introduction, that many of these NATO 
countries are then no longer responsible for providing a military stronghold in their region due to 
the overwhelming presence and strength of the US in NATO.  We were not sure on what the sign 
of the interaction would be, however in this case, it is negative.  A non-NATO member of the 
former Iron Curtain will see a 0.00408% increase in growth given a 1-percentage point increase 
in ME, holding all else equal.  This of course must be taken with precaution as the ME 
coefficient is statistically insignificant.  
Our main interest is in what the net effect is of ME controlling for NATO membership.  
Based on the above table, we cannot tell whether or not that coefficient, which is represented by 
𝛽1̂ + 𝛽3̂, is significant or not, although the sign is negative, -0.01762. Despite this, we would say 
that a NATO member would see a decrease in GDP growth by a value of 0.1123% if ME 
increases by 1-percentage point, holding  all else equal. 
We performed an F-test to detect significance, to which we got an F-statistic of 2.54 and 
a p-value of 0.1123. Using stringent guidelines, we would classify the net effect of ME to be 
negative and statistically insignificant, although one could argue that it is marginally significant.    
Looking at the fixed effects relationships year by year, the results are intriguing, 
however, not surprising.  It is noticeable how much stronger these economies were during the 
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Clinton presidency in the 1990s or even perhaps riding the coattails of the “dot com” boom.  A 
sharp fall in GDP occurs in 2009 as a result of the Great Recession, and growth since then has 
been relatively slow.  Fixed effects by country are similar, although Bulgaria appears to be an 
isolated case since the sign is positive.  However, we do not have adequate information to make 
any assumptions as to why that is. 
Overall, we are hesitant to make a final assessment on how ME affects GDP growth. 
While statistically insignificant, it is important to recognize the vast differences within each 
country that may affect its level of economic growth.  Perhaps a more in depth, individualized 
analysis would be more appropriate. 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
Consensus amongst economists on the effects of military expenditures and economic 
growth is widely lacking. Theories can be broken down into two schools of thought, the 
Structuralists and the “Free Market Thinkers”.  The Structuralists contend that defense spending 
can actually increase economic growth through higher employment and the contribution to 
building infrastructure.  Free Market Thinkers argue the opposite, and that increasing defense 
spending leads to “crowding out”.  Some economists claim there is no relationship between the 
two at all. 
The previous literatures are divided by generational differences, the First Generation 
(1970s-early 1990s) being the more theoretical, and the New Generation (1990s onward), 
employ more econometric methods for their analysis.  Our model was inspired by the pioneer of 
the New Generation, Xavier Sala-i-Martin.  After running a lagged fixed effects model, our 
results were inconclusive, much like those of Sala-i-Martin.  However, in our case, we have 18 
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countries, all from about the same area.  We may have all of our countries in the same region, but 
that does not imply that these countries actually are the same.  For a more comprehensive 
analysis on growth and defense expenditures, we believe a more individualized approach would 
be more appropriate.  
 In the case of the former Soviet satellites and Republics, it may also have to do with the 
NATO presence of the United States.  For example, many of the tanks that arrived in the Ukraine 
as part of support against the Russian invasion of Crimea are primarily American, despite the 
closer, (and likely even better quality) tanks from Germany.  As long as these countries remain 
militarily overshadowed by a global policeman, like the US, it may be difficult to make a 
realistic conclusion. 
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